The article deals with the issue of creating a new legal institution (regime) to suppress cases of a significant price increase of socially significant goods in the antimonopoly legislation.

Antitrust laws have traditionally been used to prevent price increases. For this, the institutions of the prohibition of abuse of dominant position, the warning on the inadmissibility of violating the antimonopoly law, antimonopoly checks, the warning on the inadmissibility of violating the antimonopoly law, the prohibition of concerted actions that restrict competition, the prohibition of agreements that restrict competition, the prohibition of the coordination of economic activities that restrict competition, are used. However, these institutions are not universal and are limited in their application when it comes to raising prices through monopolistic activity, and, in addition, they are cumbersome and have long response times in cases where the alleged infringer does not voluntarily lower prices. At the same time, based on the social task of preventing price increases in the changed conditions, both post-pandemic and post-sanctions, the state and society are looking for ways to prevent a significant increase in prices. The Draft Law presented by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia is an attempt to include in the antimonopoly legislation a simple and rather “quick” legal institution (regime) in application, aimed at preventing sharp price surges in socially significant commodity markets. The article discusses the question of how this institution correlates with the goals and spirit of the antimonopoly legislation.