The article is devoted to defining the features of antimonopoly regulation of digital platforms that are the main participants in digital markets. Digital platforms, occupying a dominant position due to the possession of technologies and other objects of intellectual property, are beginning to influence related product markets, including the real sector of the economy, which may create prerequisites for limiting competition. From these positions, the need to update approaches to the analysis of the state of competition in digital markets has been established, including the use of a “hypothetical decrease in the quality of a product (service) test” of a digital platform and an assessment of the “network effects” of this platform. It has been proven that maintaining “immunities” against prohibitions on abuse of dominant position for economic entities owning intellectual property, including digital platforms, leads to risks of violating the rights and legitimate interests of digital market participants.

The purpose of the article is to identify the main directions for improving the Russian antimonopoly legislation in the context of the dynamic development of digital markets.

Research methods: general scientific (dialectical) and special (formal-legal, comparative-legal, technical-legal, etc.) methods and techniques of formal logic (analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction).

Brief conclusions: With the emergence of economic entities owning digital platforms as the main participants in digital markets, the analysis of the state of competition in commodity markets has become more complicated, including in order to establish the dominant position of these entities. Based on this, it is assumed that in order to establish the dominant position of an entity owning a platform in the digital market, the “test of a hypothetical decrease in the quality of a product (service)” and the assessment of the impact of “network effects” of such a platform, provided for by the “fifth antimonopoly package”, are subject to application. In order to prevent abuse of a dominant position by right holders — economic entities owning digital platforms, Part 4 of Art. 10 and Part 9 of Art. 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition. The preservation of these “antimonopoly immunities” creates high risks of violation of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian participants in digital markets by foreign corporations, as evidenced by both judicial practice and the practice of antimonopoly authorities.